Functional Changes in the Trade Unions. From Intermediary to Fractal Organization? by Dörre, Klaus
www.ssoar.info
Functional Changes in the Trade Unions. From
Intermediary to Fractal Organization?
Dörre, Klaus
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Rainer Hampp Verlag
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Dörre, K. (2011). Functional Changes in the Trade Unions. From Intermediary to Fractal Organization? International
Journal of Action Research, 7(1), 8-48. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-412830
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
International Journal of Action Research, 7(1), 2011: 8-48 DOI 10.1688/1861-9916_IJAR_2011_01_Doerre 
ISSN 1861-1303 (print), ISSN 1861-9916 (internet)  © Rainer Hampp Verlag, www.Hampp-Verlag.de 
 
Functional Changes in the Trade Unions. 
From Intermediary to  
Fractal Organization? 
Klaus Dörre 
 
This contribution deals with developments in German Trade Unionism 
since the world economic crisis of 2008/09. Internationally, the crisis 
management of the German metalworkers’ union IG Metall is held in high 
esteem and regarded as a role model. It seems as if social integrative cor-
poratism has emerged triumphant from the crisis. However, appearances 
are deceptive. It is argued here that we are once again witnessing a func-
tional change in trade unionism. Corporatism is acquiring a new meaning; 
it must not be equated with corporatism in the era of prosperous post-war 
capitalism. In societies marked by divided labour markets and expanding 
precariousness, corporatism generates different outcomes. Trade Unions 
run the risk of degenerating into mere representatives of pressure groups, 
aligning themselves with factions of the political and economic élite in or-
der to further special interests. The concept of trade unions as intermedi-
ary organisations is no longer sufficient to explain this functional change. 
Key words: Germany, trade unions, trade union functions, corporatism, 
crisis  
„Die IG Metall hat Bundesverteidigungsminister Karl-Theodor 
zu Guttenberg vor einer massiven Kürzung des Rüstungsetats 
gewarnt. Mit den jetzt geplanten Einsparungen würden 30.000 
Arbeitsplätze in Deutschland vernichtet und die “militärische 
Luftfahrtindustrie kaputt gemacht“, sagten EADS-
Gesamtbetriebsratschef Thomas Pretzl und IG-Metall-
Konzernbetreuer Bernhard Stiedl. Sie kündigten den Wider-
stand der Gewerkschaft an (…)“ Meldung der Tagesschau vom 
14.09.2010 
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“The metalworkers’ union IG Metall has warned Federal Min-
ister of Defence Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg against a mas-
sive cut in the defence budget. By implementing the scheduled 
savings, 30,000 jobs would be wiped out and the “military 
aeronautical industry ruined", stated the head of the EADS 
joint works council, Thomas Pretzl and IG Metall union co-
ordinator for EADS, Bernhard Stiedl. They have announced 
union resistance (...)” News item on Tagesschau, broadcast 14 
Sept, 2010 
1.  A particular situation in Germany? 
The economy is only just beginning to come out of its decline, and the social 
consequences of the global financial market disaster cannot yet be measured 
even approximately, but one of the apparent losers can already be identified. 
At least in the centres of capitalism, labour and union movements are emerg-
ing from the crisis considerably weakened. This, at least, is the tenor of an 
international debate among renowned industrial relations researchers. Ac-
cording to their findings, neither the reduced scope of action brought about 
by the global financial and economic crisis, nor the unions’ reactions to the 
economic near-meltdown can inspire any confidence that organised represen-
tation of labour interests might be revitalised. A clear answer is given to the 
question whether unions might actually gain in strength in the wake of the 
global disaster: “Not at this time, not during this crisis!” (Crouch 2010; also 
Baccaro 2010; Hyman/Gumbrell-McCormick 2010; Regini 2010; Milkman 
2010). 
This is, of course, a diagnosis which can hardly surprise us. The fact that 
especially in situations of severe crisis, unions show a tendency of securing 
positions by means of negotiation and co-determination, instead of going for 
open conflict with the economic and political élites, was already identified by 
Rosa Luxemburg (1971: 39).1 During economic crises with high unemploy-
                                           
1 In reaction to German union leaders’ complaints in debate about the “chaotic” and 
“disorganized” character of the mass strikes in Russia, she mockingly retorted: “Dame 
History, from afar, smilingly hoaxes the bureaucratic lay figures who keep grim watch 
at the gate over the fate of the German trade unions. […] And while the guardians of 
the German trade unions for the most part fear that the organisations will fall in pieces 
in a revolutionary whirlwind like rare porcelain, the Russian revolution shows us the 
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ment, the major power resources of the unions: control of labour markets and 
production processes, erode. In such situations, union leadership groups tend 
towards trading concessions from the government and organised capital for 
assuming the role of co-operative crisis management. Especially in Germany, 
union strategies of this kind have a long tradition, and in view of the 
2008/2009 crisis, they were reintroduced; apparently with success. The 
actions of union leadership groups in Germany have been close to optimal 
with regard to practical application of the sociological concept of intermedi-
ary organisation. They have proven themselves as crisis managers, as their 
political bargaining has scored concessions (generous short-time work regu-
lations, the so-called Abwrackprämie (scrapping bonus) and results (securing 
the jobs of permanently employed personnel) which in other countries could 
not be achieved even by means of militant protest. 
The crisis-related weakening of organised labour interests, as well as the 
relative power of German trade unions, is of great consequence to the field of 
industrial relations research. For at first glance, both phenomena are clearly 
in contrast to a debate taking place in the context of what has become known 
as “Labour Revitalisation Studies”. Despite all the differences in the details, 
this discussion on revitalisation in the social sciences signals the possibility 
that the German trade unions might learn something from recent approaches 
at reorganising by some North American wage earners’ organisations as well 
as from the type of social movement unionism practiced in a number of 
countries of the Global South. (Brinkmann et al. 2008). At this point in time, 
such a debate already appears redundant before it has even started properly in 
Germany. What seems to be emerging from the crisis in triumph is the cher-
ished old concept of corporatism. This is a development likely to also leave 
its marks on the science landscape. The notion of a trade union as an inter-
mediary organisation, successfully mediating between member interests and 
interests of the system, while at the same time sharpening its profile as an 
advocate of ‘the’ interests of ‘all’ wage earners (Müller-Jentsch 2008), has, 
so it would seem, proven its continuing topicality and feasibility during the 
                                           
exact opposite picture; from the whirlwind and the storm, out of the fire and glow of 
the mass strike and the street fighting rise again, like Venus from the foam, fresh, 
young, powerful, buoyant trade unions.” 
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crisis. And as if in symbolic acknowledgment of this concept, the conserva-
tive German chancellor has personally begun to re-intensify contact with top-
level union functionaries. 
Could it be that there really are reasons to hope for a “decent capitalism” 
(Dullien et al. 2011), for owners and managers who have learned that it 
makes sense to have the unions on board, and to grant their members at least 
a share of productivity increases instead of continuing to rely on quick prof-
its, maximum returns, low pay and precarisation of labour? Does it make 
sense once again to employ an analytical pattern which at least implicitly 
grants trade unions the role of system-relevant mediators in the decision-
making centres of society: a function the unions performed, if ever, then 
during the height of social bureaucratic capitalism? A rather different inter-
pretation is presented below. What we are currently experiencing, according 
to the thesis advanced here, are yet further changes in the functions of trade 
unions, in close connection to structural changes in the relations between 
capital and labour, and the underlying social (class) conflict. On the surface, 
this kind of union activity appears to be based on reactivated patterns of 
corporative conflict resolution from the era of Fordist capitalism. Yet in a 
society where labour markets are split and precariousness is expanding, such 
corporatism has a completely different effect than during the days of prosper-
ing post-war capitalism. The analytical concept of trade unions as intermedi-
ary organisations is no longer an adequate instrument to provide an in-depth 
understanding of changes of this nature. 
2.  Trade unions as intermediary organizations  
What reasons can be provided for such a point of view? As a basis for argu-
mentation, it seems feasible to begin with a brief outline of the intermediarity 
concept, which is followed by a description of the contrasting Jena Power 
Resource Approach. 
If it were merely a matter of defining intermediarity as ‘some sort of’ me-
diation between member interests and interests of the system, there would be 
no need to take a closer look at this category. Nearly all organisations of civil 
society assume the functions of mediators in developed, pluralistic capital-
12 Klaus Dörre 
   
isms. Yet in the context of trade unions, ‘intermediarity’ in the usage of the 
social sciences does in fact have a particular meaning. The concept claimed 
to be defining the term is that of the functional change of wage-earners’ 
organisations in the way it has taken place since 1945 in varying degrees of 
institutionalisation among the developed capitalisms of the Global North. 
During that historic phase, the restructuring of organised industrial relations 
was implemented on the basis of class compromise sustained by the welfare 
state in its respective national variants. In exchange for factually abandoning 
their system-transcending goals, the trade unions and to a great extent also 
the political mainstream of labour movements were ‘incorporated’ into the 
national states. Benefiting from the competing systems, and the interest of the 
US as one of the hegemonic powers to extend the burden of social costs to 
competing European national economies, a type of social-bureaucratic capi-
talism developed which combined the “anarchy of the markets” and the all-
but-military principles of organisation of highly differentiated bureaucracies 
(Sennett 2006: 15). 
During the exceptionally long period of prosperity after WWII, corporate 
bureaucracies and welfare states did indeed guarantee social stability and 
security. In this role, they were subject to the influence of a political economy 
of labour. At least in the capitalisms of continental Europe, lasting integration 
into the system could only be achieved by means of partial acknowledgment 
of collective labour interests and proletarian power. Such incorporation of 
organized labour interests can by no means be interpreted as mere “integra-
tion of class autonomy into the all-embracing logic of Capital". It is just as 
much the expression of an “expansion of the working class, of its power and 
its organically grown influence” (Buci-Glucksmann/Therborn 1982: 121). 
Especially in the capitalisms of continental Europe, to a degree never before 
experienced in history, wage labour was linked to existence- and status-
securing social property in the form of guaranteed pension claims, dismissal 
protection, work safety, co-determination rights and binding standard wages. 
Only by coupling the two, a civic status based on wage labour became possi-
ble, which despite continuing inequalities and patriarchal discrimination 
helped previously unpropertied classes in gaining respect as members of 
society. 
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The driving forces behind this development were workers’ parties and 
trade unions. The more successful they became in their endeavour to secure a 
share in productivity advances for people in employment, and to provide 
them with collective rights of protection and participation, the more these 
organisations changed themselves. In the capitalisms regulated by a welfare 
state, the base of their strategic activities shifted from structural and organ-
ised power towards institutional power.2 In the case of West Germany, this 
meant that the unions and their allies, the works councils, strove to utilise the 
‘intermediary logic’ of the dual system of interest representation, the specific 
combination of collective bargaining autonomy and co-determination as 
efficiently as possible. This strategy made it possible to keep reinforcing 
institutional union power. In the capitalisms of the Anglo-Saxon type, espe-
cially in the US, the status of the social citizen and the institutional power of 
wage-earners never reached a comparable level. Yet it was possible also in 
that system to guarantee wage-earners a certain, limited, level of social 
security and stability for individual planning, despite the fact that manage-
ment orientation was predominantly towards short-term profits. 
The still dominant conceptualisations of organised labour interests in in-
dustrial sociology must be explained in the context of this historical back-
ground. After 1945, both in approaches based on state legislation and in 
competing liberal, pluralistic approaches, a ‘pacification’ of the class conflict 
was considered irreversible. All the greater the surprise when in the late 
1960s, many Western European governments found themselves confronted 
with a return of worker militancy. Even in West Germany, IG Metall leader-
ship temporarily lost control of its member base during the spontaneous 
“Septemberstreiks” of 1969 (“September strike”).3 So, to the subsequently 
emerging kind of critical research on labour consciousness and trade unions, 
the paradigm of a consolidated (Briefs 1927: “befestigten”), generally recog-
nised trade union which had become dominant after 1945 appeared in a 
                                           
2  On the notion of power, cf. the chapter on the Jena Power Resource Approach. 
3  The “Septemberstreik” was a wave of spontaneous labour unrest in September 1969 
in West Germany that affected some of the countries’ most important industrial cen-
tres. It was characterised by largely autonomously organized strike activities which 
initially were not supported by the IG Metall. 
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different light. What needed to be explained was why the established union 
organisations, e.g. during the May 1968 riots in France, intentionally had a 
dampening effect on the radicalised basis. In retrospect, the empirical and 
theoretical research of that period starting out from this question complex 
contributed to making this phase one of the most fruitful in industrial sociol-
ogy in terms of concept development. As a result, and in different, competing 
approaches, basic categories became predominant which since then have 
entered the standard inventory of labour and industrial sociology knowledge: 
the trade union as an intermediary organisation and the dual system of inter-
est representation. 
The concept of intermediary organisation conveys that in developed capi-
talisms, trade unions abandon their class-based dual character, in favour of a 
more pragmatic role of mediator between the interests of capital and the 
system on the one hand, and workers’ or members’ interests on the other. 
Walther Müller-Jentsch has caught the essence of extensive empirical as well 
as theoretical research in an important paper (Müller-Jentsch 2008), accord-
ing to which five developments are relevant for a trade union to become an 
intermediary organisation: (1) a change of form of union organisation: a 
bureaucratised administration and professionalisation of functionaries have a 
weakening effect on intra-organisational cohesion; the objectives of the 
organisation and its members’ needs tend to match less and less, in contrast 
to craft unions; (2) a change of union interest politics: the need to generalise 
interests in large, bureaucratic organisations has the added effect that qualita-
tive interests are pushed to the bottom of the agenda in favour of quantitative 
ones (wages, working hours). The number of tasks performed on a co-
operative basis decreases, while interest representation towards the outside 
increasingly becomes the central element of policy legitimizing the organisa-
tion. In the duality of the organisation’s interests and member interests, latent 
conflict between member base and union management is inherent, where it is 
possible that the union management apparatus asserts itself in opposition to 
its members; (3) a differentiation between shop-level and sector level interest 
politics: even though there is no uniform pattern to be found in Western 
Europe after 1945, it can be said that on the whole, there is the intention of 
business management to keep the trade unions away from the shop floor. 
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Dual forms of representation are preferred by business management, and 
union presence can only be enforced by means of political or state interven-
tion. But no matter which form of interest representation becomes dominant, 
bosses are required to arrange themselves and co-operate. The same applies, 
on the other hand, to shop-level interest representation, whose organisations 
assume a relatively autonomous position of power, while at the same time 
becoming an equivalent of the classic unions and their original central pur-
poses. Such assumption of part of the burden by the shop-level organisations 
improve (4) the possibilities for institutionalisation of the conflict relation-
ship between capital and labour in the arena of wage negotiations: economi-
cally motivated disputes can be isolated from political struggles, which 
makes it easier to channel class conflict. This kind of development is then 
subsequently made permanent by means of legislation. After recognition of 
the right to associate and to strike in earlier phases, group autonomous regu-
lations are the third step towards institutionalisation of bargaining autonomy. 
As a consequence of the system of quasi-autonomous conflict regulation at 
shop level and collective bargaining level, the state appears as a neutral party. 
A growing feeling of familiarity in negotiations generates a climate of con-
sensus between the negotiating parties. All of these developments have the 
effect that trade unions are recognised by the state as representative institu-
tions. Unions are given public assignments, and thus a regulative function. 
Such changes in these organistions internally reduce the striving for solidar-
ity, which is replaced by bargainable provision of regulative services, yet 
without any actual guarantee of social peace. Finally, increasing state inter-
ventionism facilitates (5) a functionalisation of trade unions in economic 
policy: in a complex play between power restriction and self-disciplining, the 
organisation is tied in as an element of state policy, gradually becoming a 
regulative power. 
While these characteristics are still well within the scope of the criteria of 
“legally consolidated” trade unions, the concept of intermediarity reaches 
beyond Briefs’ (1927) definition in some points. What is communicated is, 
first, that for union leadership groups to give up their opportunities in the 
markets and the power game, certain preconditions must be met. The basis of 
such renouncement are a Keynesian economic policy and a type of corpora-
16 Klaus Dörre 
   
tism which “attempts to combine the leadership élites of trade unions and 
employers’ associations in one steering unit in order to co-ordinate economi-
cally relevant decisions” (Müller-Jentsch 2008: 61f.). Second, intermediarity 
does not necessarily mean forgetting about one’s capacity for conflict. Alter-
natives to co-operation do indeed exist. The differences to be observed in the 
balance between co-operation and conflict in interest politics represent 
nothing more than varieties of the intermediary trade union. Co-operation 
between the representatives of capital and labour becomes possible, because 
besides the antagonistic faction and industry interests, there are also compati-
ble ones. Due to differences in the balancing out, definition and adaptation of 
these interests, variations in the models of trade union develop. The ideal 
types marking the opposing poles are the revolutionary union and the state 
union, with the intermediary union positioned somewhere in between. The 
latter is manifest in the variants of the co-operative and the conflictory union 
as well as in the form of unions whose methods include social contract 
bargaining.4 Third, the intermediary union is active in two environments. As 
social actors, unions aim at asserting the collective interests of their members, 
and as organisations, they assume integrative functions for the institutional, 
systemic environment. A fact of significance to both social and systemic 
integration is that the intermediary trade union, too, is dependent on using 
specific power resources. What applies in this context is that union power is 
associational power, and membership figures plus mobilisation potential are 
decisive power resources. 
We must differentiate, though, between potential associational power and 
its manifest application. Manifest exertion of power in the form of strikes is 
to be considered more of an exception, which takes place when the parties’ 
interests are completely incompatible. Primarily, according to the concept of 
intermediary organisation, union interest assertion is based “on potential 
associational power; this is sufficient to achieve compromises between 
                                           
4  The actions of the co-operative union are based on good behaviour in anticipation of a 
quid pro quo; the conflictory union utilises its disruptive potential to force conces-
sions; social contract bargaining acknowledges that conformity is required, and, in re-
turn for keeping associational power reined in, expects reforms in the interest of la-
bour. 
 Functional Changes in the Trade Unions. From Intermediary to Fractal Organization? 17 
  
 
interests in collective bargaining and the ‘political exchange’”. In this, the 
organisation exerts power in various directions: “The bargaining function of 
unions has the prerequisite of the organisations’s capacity to strike, i.e. that 
power can be exerted through its members. The representative function of a 
union is based on its being able to commit its members to comply with 
negotiated agreements, i.e. that it is able to exert power over its members" 
(Müller-Jentsch 2008: 69). 
In retrospect, the concept of the “intermediary trade union” impressively, 
and in a clarity rarely accomplished in subsequent research, describes the 
transformation of wage earners’ associational power to institutional power, 
although without ever mentioning this last term. Institutional power appears 
as latent, unused power; it is not attributed any specific, particular quality or 
function in analysis. In consequence, the notion of integration remains on a 
single plane; the dimensions and contradictions of any kind of integration of 
wage-earner power tend to get lost in it, and the tension field of social and 
systemic integration is offered in replacement. Defining mainly the aspect of 
organisation, membership interests and their constitution process remain 
underexposed in analysis. The perspective of organisation is emphasized, 
while neglecting the membership angle: it appears as if the intermediary 
union as a regulative power has always been part of the system. This way, the 
trade union is conceptualised in an extremely functionalistic manner, while 
its members and their individual roles are hardly taken into account at all. 
Also according to this concept, interest regulation does require difficult 
balancing acts which can only be coped with if the organisation develops 
specific integration mechanisms (normative incorporation/integration of 
active members, collective/union/association ideology, political traditions) 
and selection instruments (socio-structural filtering of interests, separation of 
decision and participation). What is crucial, though, is that the intermediary 
union is declared an integral component of the system regulating labour 
relations. 
In the developed capitalisms, the interests of labour are no longer repre-
sented exclusively by trade unions, but additionally also by labour admini-
stration and social insurance, as well as by shop-level interest representation. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, a dual structure of collective bargaining 
18 Klaus Dörre 
   
has developed as a particular characteristic. The institutionalised class con-
flict takes place by means of quantifiable demands in the arena of autono-
mous collective bargaining, while qualitative labour interests are a matter of 
shop-level interest representation. Only in cases where the works councils are 
overburdened, negotiations are shifted to another level. This dual system, on 
the other hand, is supported by collective securing mechanisms, by which 
wage earners’ general reproduction interests are taken care of. Such incorpo-
ration in collective security systems makes it easier for the unions to concen-
trate on ‘job owners’. Although the intermediary unions keep shifting be-
tween co-operative and conflictory forms of interest assertion, institutional 
integration has a kind of ‘gravity effect’ drawing them towards forms of co-
operation. Thus, the former “schools of socialism” turn into pillars of a 
capitalism regulated by the welfare state (Müller-Jentsch 2008: 78). 
3.  The power resource approach 
The above is at least the outline of an ideal-type reconstruction of the inter-
mediary union. A significant weakness of this approach is revealed at first 
glance when observed in retrospect: in what way associational power, which 
to a great extent remains latent, is reproduced, and whether it is recognised 
permanently by the collective opponents, remains unclear in the model of 
unions as intermediary organisations. Accordingly, the concept’s normative 
content has altered considerably. While originally intended as a criticism of 
fossilised, bureaucratic and centralistic structures of the institutionalised 
union,5 the concept of intermediarity has, in the course of time, become a 
model representing a conservative institutionalism. What the criticism was 
initially aimed at: the conflict-dampening effect of a professionalised appara-
tus combining subordinate interests in order to negotiate them on behalf of 
(all) wage earners, was more and more romanticised by declaring it a 
strength, especially in view of the crisis of what were formerly considered 
reference models of labour relations in Italy, France or the UK. By the mid-
                                           
5  And, it should be added, a left-wing criticism of neo-Marxist concepts of class 
autonomy as represented, among others, by the Abendroth school. On this subject, cf.: 
Deppe (1979). 
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1990s, the comparatively stable dual system in Germany had become some-
thing of an example for a Europe-wide reorganisation of labour relations 
(Müller-Jentsch 1995). In principle, all that remained of the bureaucracy 
criticism initially inspired by the notion of council democracy was the posi-
tive connotation of co-determination and shop-level interest representation in 
relation to industry-wide union organisation. Thus, in a phase of monetarism 
and deregulation, the kind of trade union research observing the matter from 
a libertarian, socialist perspective was given a social liberal foundation. 
In analysis, the actual core problem of the intermediarity approach is that 
social changes are discussed exclusively from the point of view of a (de-)sta-
bilisation of institutions. What in the original model was designed to reflect 
the availability of power resources, as the central prerequisite of effective 
representation of collective interests, got lost more and more as the concept 
was developed further. This deficiency is the starting point of the Jena Power 
Resource Approach. This concept, which is still at the stage of being formu-
lated in detail, is constructed around the central notion that sources of 
worker’s power (Silver 2003: 13-25) once again need to be made a point of 
reference from which to begin researching social conflict as well as the actors 
and institutions involved in it. To illustrate what the concept is aimed at and 
what it can (potentially) explain, its central categories are presented below in 
an appropriately condensed form. 
First, wage earner power can be determined separate from a general defi-
nition of power. According to Max Weber, power is defined as “the probabil-
ity that one actor within a social relationship will be in the position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance” (Weber 1978: 53). In connection to this, 
Michael Mann differentiates between four basic ideal types of power: eco-
nomic, political, ideological and military power (Mann 1994: 46-56, esp. 
50f.). In modern societies, these four basic forms are combined in particular 
ways. Thus, the authoritative, hierarchic power of states and corporate bu-
reaucracies can be used to limit the diffuse, seemingly faceless power of 
markets. It is also possible, on the other hand, to strengthen market mecha-
nisms in order to limit, e.g., authoritative power. But the correlation between 
de- and recommodification, which is a feature of long periods of capitalistic 
development (Yergin/Stanislaw 1999), is to a relevant degree dependent on a 
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power configuration which does appear in Mann’s work, but is not made 
adequately concrete in its particularity by coining a term for it. What we are 
concerned with here is oppositional, counter-hegemonial, heterodox power. 
In its origin, worker’s power represents such a form of heterodox power 
exercised across the basic types of social power, as one that has economic, 
political and ideological qualities. The category of worker’s power is used in 
analysis here, in the sense of wage earners’ bargaining power, i.e. in an 
appropriately broad sense (Silver 2003: 13). A basic assumption is that more 
or less heterogeneous groups of workers and employees have the common 
interest to correct asymmetries in the exchange relationships between capital 
and labour by means of collective mobilisation of particular power resources. 
Up to the present day, attempts along these lines result in the formation of 
various kinds of workers’ movements whose social base, forms of organiza-
tion and objectives can differ quite significantly. Some pursue system-
transcending goals (Marx-type labour unrest), others merely seek protection 
against competition generated by free markets (Polanyi-type labour unrest). 
They may have reactionist, nationalistic features, or even, as in the case of 
fascist mobilisations, include elements of terrorism (cf. Silver 2003: 20). In 
contrast to the implications of Marx’s class universalism, which assumes that 
the “exploitation of the world market [has] given a cosmopolitan character to 
production and consumption in every country” (Marx/Engels 2009: 8), 
worker’s power should therefore be referred to in the plural. For the presence 
of the leveling power of the markets encourages “an endemic tendency for 
workers to draw non-class borders and boundaries as a basis for claims for 
protection from the maelstrom” (Silver 2003: 22; Wright 2000). Also for this 
reason, it makes sense to speak of not only one movement, but a plurality of 
workers’ movements which, depending on the situation, assemble their 
respective power base from different sources and combinations of social 
power. 
In principle, we can differentiate between structural and associational 
wage earner power. Structural power accrues from the position of wage 
earners in the economic system. It can be manifest in the form of primary 
negotiating power resulting from a tense labour market situation, just as it can 
take the form of productive power constituted by a particular strategic posi-
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tion of workers’ groups within production processes. This must be separated 
from associational power, which is generated by association in collective 
political or union-type workers’ organisations. Associational power can 
partly substitute structural negotiating and productive power, without com-
pletely replacing it. Structural power is often exercised spontaneously, it 
appears in the form of labour unrest, in sudden uprisings and situational 
outrage, just as it is present as sabotage or absenteeism in production proc-
esses (Silver 2003: 25ff.). In contrast, associational power is dependent on 
effective unions, parties or similar collective actors. 
Additionally, a third source of worker’s power can be named, which is in-
stitutional power. It unfolds as a result of negotiations and conflicts which are 
also argued out by means of structural or associational power resources. Its 
particular quality is the fact that institutions fix and to a certain degree legally 
codify basic social compromises across economic developments and short-
term changes in power relations in society. Institutional power pre-forms 
negotiating procedures and action strategies of collective actors, works 
councils, trade unions and employers’ association which can be considered 
verisimilar, plausible and binding even if power relations in society change 
drastically. Institutionalised resources can be used by trade unions, even in 
times when their associational power is declining. This is assuming, of 
course, that despite reduced bonding capacity among blue-collar and white-
collar workers, wage-earner organisations continue to be accepted as authen-
tic representatives of collective labour interests by governments and employ-
ers’ association. Structural, associational and institutional wage-earner power 
develop in phases. One form of power emanates from another, yet not in the 
sense of strict linearity and permanent reinforcement. Over extensive periods 
of time, and depending on political as well as socioeconomic influences, the 
sources of wage-earner power continue to exist in varying combinations and 
organisational forms, and to some extent even in competition with one an-
other. Under this perspective, changes in industrial relations systems and the 
functions of interest representation by means of trade unions can be identified 
and analysed as changes in the availability of power resources. 
Compared to the conventional intermediarity approach, such a focus on 
power resources has several advantages. First, the power resource approach 
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is not limited to examination concentrated on organisations and institutions 
alone, but makes it possible to perceive the actors involved in social conflict 
in their plurality. This way, factors other than the classic elements of organ-
ised interest representation can be included in the analysis, such as social 
movements and non-normative conflicts and forms of combat. It is necessary 
to widen the field of view in such a way to be able to get some measure of 
understanding of the multitude and variety of protest and movement forms 
which have been developing since well before the global economic crisis, 
also in the developed capitalisms (Wacquant 2008; Waddington et al. 2009). 
Second, this approach makes it possible to analyse non-simultaneities brought 
about by, e.g., the parallel occurrence of a decline of institutionalised trade 
unions in some developed capitalisms on the one hand and the emergence of 
new labour movements in some countries of the global South on the other. 
Third, this approach could contribute towards creating a synthesis between 
daily, ‘real-life’ suffering under the capitalist system and social criticism 
based on scientific methods, by specifically targetting the so-called “herme-
neutic contradiction” in institutions, the structural non-identity of institution-
alised expectations/promises and the contrasting social conditions in reality 
(Boltanski 2010).6 And fourth, and most significant in this particular context, 
the approach makes it possible to analyse, in terms of power sociology, the 
Landnahme of financial capitalism, its effect on industrial relations and thus 
also the central prerequisites for a revival of trade unions’ capacity to act. 
4.  The erosion of worker power and the renewal of trade unions 
Although depending on the respective power resources available, trade 
unions always have the opportunity to make strategic choices. They are not 
                                           
6  In their co-authored work, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello argued that the weakness 
of trade unions also indicates a crisis of science-based social criticism (Boltanski/ 
Chiapello 2005: 273f.). Without an alternative “workers’ standpoint “documented by 
concrete data as can be gathered from union movements across shop floors and indus-
tries, “it is in fact difficult to counterbalance firms’ owns analyses of buisness devel-
opments whose content is geared towards concerns about profits“ (ibid.: 274). Other-
wise, so their line of reasoning, social criticism remains detached as if suspended in 
the air, and from such a position, the working world appears as a conglomeration of 
circumstantial constraints wage earners have hardly any chance of avoiding. 
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all-powerful, though within the limits of certain courses of action, wage-
earner organisations have been able to adapt more or less successfully to 
changing situations in society. Yet since the 1980s, such attempts have 
definitely been less and less successful, at least within the developed capital-
isms. In most of these countries, there was relatively little the unions could 
muster up in opposition against the ‘top-bottom’ Landnahme of financial 
capitalism (Dörre 2009a). Since the 1980s, the unions have lost dramatically 
in associational power, also in Germany, and this process was accelerated by 
drastic socio-economic structural changes. A short-term increase in member-
ship figures due to recruitment in the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) masked this development for a few years, but since then, the negative 
trend has continued without much interruption.7 
With the associational power of unions in decline, there are also fewer in-
centives for capital to organize (Haipeter 2009). Collective agreements are 
losing their binding character, and union-free zones without participation or 
collective bargaining are expanding. By 2009, the proportion of job-holders 
paid according to union rates had gone down to 62% in Germany. Yet this is 
only one of many symptoms indicating that a decline in associational power 
also brings about an erosion of institutional power resources the German 
unions are also affected by. The fact that trade unions have gradually lost 
their institutional influence in social, health, pension and labour market 
policy, in the course of recommodifying reforms, is no less serious (Urban 
2010; Streeck 2009; Gerlinger 2009). Around the middle of the past decade, 
it even seemed as if relevant factions among the political and economic élites 
were ready to complete the decline of union associational power and gradual 
weakening of institutional wage-earner power by means of symbolic, politi-
cal debasement. A central prerequisite for intermediarity to work, the ac-
knowledgement of trade unions as an indispensable regulatory power within 
the system, was suddenly no longer a matter of course. After the failure of the 
                                           
7  After a long period of decline, in 2010, the degree of union organization was stabi-
lised at a relatively low level in Germany. Smaller unions such as the NGG or the 
GEW even recorded increases in membership figures. 
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“Bündnis für Arbeit und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit”,8 a reform of the German 
model seemed possible only by weakening the trade unions. Leading econo-
mists declared that the high unemployment level was primarily due to union 
activities. Thus, Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the IFO-Institut, claimed that a 
“labour market in the stranglehold of the trade unions” has the effect that “in 
collective bargaining, wages are increased beyond the balance level", with 
the effect of a “permanent surplus in exchanging the commodity of labour, 
which is what we call unemployment” (Sinn 2005: 143, 150). 
Such kind of statements provided the ideological background for a policy 
that had the effect of weakening the trade unions, also institutionally, by 
means of deregulating the financial sector, and introducing an active labour 
market, among other factors.9 This development was the point of approach 
for the Jena group of researchers in their contemplations regarding a new 
concept of industrial relations research. In view of the crisis of union repre-
sentation and the erosion of institutional wage-earner power, appropriate 
scientific analysis of the potential for renewal of (German) trade unions 
appeared possible only if new sources of power could be identified, or tradi-
tional ones reactivated. In such a situation, ‘strategic choice’ could only 
mean: revitalisation of trade unions by means of reinforcing associational 
power, e.g. through targeted organising also and particularly among under-
represented social groups, through organisational restructuring, winning back 
members, campaign and movement orientation, as well as an innovative 
policy of alliances with social movements and NGOs in the reproduction 
sector in order to get access to external power resources outside the work-
place (Brinkmann et al. 2008). 
Such an agenda, represented by movement and organising unions not only 
in the US, but especially also in countries of the Global South, could not 
simply be transferred to the German system, of this we were sure. The na-
tional industrial relations systems were and still are too different for such a 
                                           
8 The “Bündnis für Arbeit und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit” was an intermediating associa-
tion including functionaries from politics, trade unions, and employees’ organisation 
established by the social-democratic Federal Chancellor Schröder in 1998. 
9  Using three regions as examples: Dörre and Röttger (2006) 
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transfer to be possible without major problems. In the North American sys-
tem of industrial relations, for example, works councils do not exist; if trade 
unions have been recognized by an enterprise, (often) the entire workforce is 
considered unionised. In contrast, in Germany, the trade unions generally do 
not have direct access to the shop floor, they require the assistance of elected 
shop-floor interest representation, whose members may or may not be union-
ised. Therefore, in Germany, any attempt at organising new areas often 
means that works councils need to be established first. 
Due to such institutional divergence and greatly different union traditions, 
many scientific observers were rather sceptical about whether and how the 
experiences made by North American organising unions could be transferred 
to the German situation (e.g. Frege/Kelly 2003). For a long time, in the 
severely legally-oriented German system of industrial relations, aggressive 
membership canvassing was not considered an essential instrument. Com-
pared to other countries, the unions rarely had to resort to the means of 
membership mobilisation due to their being institutionally embedded to such 
a great extent. Additionally, in Germany, the erosion of institutional negotiat-
ing power had by no means progressed as far as in the Anglo-Saxon-type 
capitalisms. On the other hand, German social movements and NGOs were 
far weaker, so that forming alliances with these could not have compensated 
for dwindling union associational power. This is yet another reason why the 
majority of unions associated in the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) 
shied away from sacrificing the negotiating power they still had at their 
disposal, from participation and the collective bargaining system, in favour of 
a risky policy of forming alliances with opposition movements. 
Nevertheless, in spite of all justified warnings against unreflected adop-
tion of practices derived from different industrial relations models, certain 
organising approaches have quickly made it to the top of the list in a number 
of DGB unions. In the metalworkers’ union IG Metall, a special campaign 
department devises organising projects. The service sector union Ver.di is 
testing organising methods in hospitals as well as the retail and security 
trades. The Gewerkschaft Bau, Agrar, Umwelt (IG BAU) is training organis-
ers and making an effort to aggressively recruit new members. Learning 
processes can be observed also in areas of organisation where there is no 
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purposeful orientation towards organising approaches or where they are 
explicitly rejected. At first glance, the adoption of individual instruments of 
the organising approach appears to be relatively uncomplicated. Thus, a 
Ver.di campaign addressed to the discount food chain LIDL was explicitly 
devised according to the example of North American unions’ comprehensive 
campaigns. A further example is campaigns aimed at improving representa-
tion and at recruiting precariously employed persons. In this respect, the 
minimum wage campaign, which is meanwhile supported by several DGB 
member unions, can hardly be overestimated in its symbolic political func-
tion. Decentralised initiatives are just as important. Numerous DGB sections 
have thus begun to gather data on the development of precarious employ-
ment. In the organisational sphere of the IG Metall, there are initiatives 
aiming for equal pay and equal treatment for temporary workers, or at least to 
improve their situation and to unionise them. In this they are supported by the 
staff associations of large temporary staffing companies. There are further 
examples of possibilities for a participatory renewal of German trade unions, 
among which especially the beginnings of a revenue-sharing bargaining 
policy, the innovation-oriented campaign “Besser statt Billiger” (“Better 
instead of Cheaper”) or the innovative project “Gute Arbeit” (“Good Work”), 
both initiated by the IG Metall, should be mentioned. 
At least until the global crisis, this was the position of the Jena group of 
researchers. The question no longer seemed to be whether, but in what way 
the experiences made across the Atlantic could serve as learning material. 
These first tender buds of union revival have so far not been subjected to 
critical analytical observation, and these approaches have not all been 
squashed by the crisis and its consequences. Yet in one significant respect, 
the situation has changed severely. Organizing, in the ‘broad sense’ we 
favour, involves an organisational change demanding political unionism, a 
priority of matters such as equality and fairness over economic efficiency, 
and a wide range of tactical and strategic measures including conflictory 
practices (Brinkmann et al. 2008: 110). Such a comprehensive organizational 
change can hardly be expected to be implemented as long as in the socio-
political arena, the motto is selective involvement of the unions, and union 
leadership groups are all too happy to accept offers of this kind while giving 
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up on any kind of serious opposition, not least due to massive doubts about 
the mobilisation capability of their organisations. 
This is how the positioning has changed in the course of the two crisis 
years. The door which had been about to slam shut on the unions, leading to 
deals among the élites under inclusion of union leadership groups, has sud-
denly begun to open again. The so-called “Krisenkorporatismus” (“crisis 
corporatism”: Urban 2010; Ehlscheid et al. 2010: 43-49) in Germany was 
successful because in the course of the global economic disaster, the political 
and the economic élites became divided. The political élites were startled by 
the crisis and looked around for allies who might support their crisis man-
agement. Fear of losing their own positions of power, and insecurity because 
the multitude of free-market-orthodox political advisors had failed, induced 
parts of the weakened political class to resume intense co-operation with 
those representatives of organized labour interests who before the crisis had 
been sent to bed without dinner (Roth 2010: 119-130). This is the main 
reason why the German unions were permitted to make a comeback. This 
very return to the scene is about to disprove one of the core theses of the 
debate on labour revitalisation. For the German unions appear to be continu-
ing to act in a path-dependent manner, in path conformity. At least at first 
glance, the key to their success is nothing much else but dear old classic 
corporatism. 
Without exaggerating, we can say that the German unions, and the IG 
Metall in particular, have shown great skill in coping with the effects of the 
crash by means of short-term crisis management 2008-2010. If around the 
middle of the decade, the unions were vilified by public opinion as stick-in-
the-mud reform spoilers, they are now being praised as the architects of the 
German post-crash ‘Beschäftigungswunder’. It is indeed a fact that the sup-
posedly ailing ‘Rhine capitalism’ has survived the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis in much better condition than its global countermodel, Anglo-
Saxon market-centred capitalism (Müller-Jentsch 2009: 61-70). Even though 
the economy in Germany has sustained its greatest decline since 1949, the 
negative effects on the labour market anticipated by many have manifested 
only to a very limited extent. Relatively conventional measures such as long-
term short-time work and the so-called Abwrackprämie (scrapping bonus) 
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made it possible to secure the jobs of most of those in permanent employ-
ment. Such co-operation appears to be paying off for the German unions. In 
anticipation of the coming wage negotiation round, for the first time in a long 
period, DGB member organisations feel they might begin to make headway 
again. Even experts known for their affinity for the entrepreneur’s position 
publicly advocate making use of the scope for redistribution to increase 
wages. Their recommendations for wage increases by no means reflect the 
profits and returns many globally oriented companies have realised during 
and after the crisis;10 yet for the first time in many years, the trade unions can 
be relatively certain that their wage demands are not made in defiance of 
public opinion. 
If we neglect to look at the details, this seems to be an unrebuttable con-
firmation of the concept of trade unions as intermediary organisations. In 
political exchange, the unions are acting as a system-stabilising regulatory 
factor, and via this regulatory function, they represent their members’ inter-
ests. In return, except for one symbolic DGB convention on capitalism, the 
unions are prepared to do without a noisy settling of accounts with the eco-
nomic and political élites. In particular, they are avoiding the matter of 
questioning the entire system, an issue even radical free-market economists 
fidgeted over for a short while. The German unions’ concern about the 
continuing existence of those industries they still have a foothold in makes 
them ask for nothing extra in exchange for their active involvement in crisis 
management. This means that the unions prioritise the system-stabilising 
“logic of influence” while trying to keep the problem of declining associa-
tional power and capacity for conflict shelved. 
5.  A divided labour market and conservatism in interest policies 
These are the facts of the situation in Germany. Is this really still the tradi-
tional corporatism, the corporatism which even in earlier phases mostly took 
effect indirectly and selectively? To put it clearly and unmistakeably: the 
                                           
10 In 2010, the DAX-listed companies alone recorded a 75% increase in profits. For the 
coming years, profit increases of 10 to 12% are explicitly expected (Frankfurter Rund-
schau 2010: 12f.). 
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answer is ‘No’! “Crisis corporatism” is a particularistic action strategy, as it 
does not seriously question the rifts in the labour market and between groups 
of subordinates the Landnahme of financial capitalism has created, but on the 
contrary, contributes towards widening them further, although unintentionally 
to some extent. As a consequence, corporative integration means something 
very different than in the days when Fordist capitalism was at its height. And 
it does not mean a return to the ‘selective corporatism’ of the 1980s and 
1990s. At that time, the term was used in the sense that the kind of interest 
representation by means of unions which relied on a relative balance of 
power only reached parts of the working population (Esser 2003: 78). The 
policy of safeguarding jobs the German unions implemented during the crisis 
is not merely a policy to the benefit of the diminishing regularly employed 
workforce. It results from exclusive solidarity, perpetuates mechanisms of 
secondary exploitation (Dörre 2010a: 125f.), and partly, not even the attempt 
is made any longer to make the claim of representing wage earners’ interests 
in general. In other words, this is at best a corporatism of weakened partners 
which somehow works because it is merely aggravating the power imbalance 
already present in the labour market. Where employment risks are systemati-
cally offloaded on the precariously employed, the rifts that could be observed 
before the crisis become even deeper. One consequence of this is that the 
erosion not only of the unions’ associational power, but also of their institu-
tional power is progressing further: a development which cannot fail to have 
an effect for those regular employees to which union representation still 
extends. 
The following striking examples serve to illustrate these developments in 
the German labour market. In concert with the newly created market for 
corporate control, shareholder-value-driven forms of management and the 
‘short-termism’ of management decisions had created a situation already 
before the crisis where no longer merely the peripheral staff were employed 
in flexible jobs. Additionally boosted politically by the labour market reforms 
of Schroeder’s red-green coalition government, increases in the figures of 
employment relationships are primarily to be found among the so-called 
atypical forms of employment. Before the climax of the global economic 
crisis in 2008, already 7.7 million people were in atypical jobs (such as part-
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time, temping, fixed-term employment, marginal employment), with a further 
2.1 million in self-employment. Within ten years, the number of atypical 
employment relationships has increased by 46.2% (with an increase of mar-
ginal employment by 71.5%) and of those in self-employment by 27.8%. 
This is in contrast to the number of normal employment relationships (over 
20 hours per week, for one employer), which has gone down by 3%. This 
trend has been continuing since the crisis. In 2010, a year of economic re-
vival, a new record in employment figures was reached with 40.37 million 
job holders, yet compared to 2008, the number of full-time jobs has gone 
down by yet a further 200,000 (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2011: 19). 
It should be considered that not every case of atypical employment is nec-
essarily precarious; yet on average, non-standardised jobs also mean a no-
ticeably lower income and higher risks of unemployment and poverty. At the 
centre of the zone of precariousness lies the low-wage sector, which in 
Germany is expanding more rapidly than in any other European country. In 
2009, approximately 20.7% of the workforce were employed in the low-wage 
sector, meaning that – partly even in permanent jobs – they earn less than two 
thirds of the median wage (EUR 9.06 per hour before tax). Among these, the 
largest groups are women and persons with low qualifications. Yet about 
three quarters of all low-wage earners have completed professional training, 
and 7% even have an academic degree. So despite the fact that qualifications 
exist, the German low-wage sector, when comparing it internationally, is 
characterised by a low degree of upward mobility and enormously high wage 
disparity. In extreme cases, wages are down to as low as EUR 1.50 to 2.00 
per hour (e.g. for motorway toilet attendants or self-employed hairdressers 
renting a chair at a salon). This is possible because despite the fact that 
officially, unemployment figures are going down in Germany, the reserve 
army of underemployed persons is shrinking only very slowly. If all persons 
in job-creating measures, persons in ‘one-euro jobs’ and persons temporarily 
unfit to work are added to the official unemployment figures, then unem-
ployment has gone down from 4.9 million in 2007 to just over 4.7 million in 
March 2010. So on the whole, the actual figure is “closer to five rather than 
around three million unemployed” (Astheimer 2010: 9). 
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This is consistent with the fact that the number of persons who, in addi-
tion to their wages, require further support in the form of unemployment 
benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II) is rising continually.11 For 2009 alone, an in-
crease by 5% (corresponding to 71,000 job holders) can be observed. If all 
those eligible for Arbeitslosengeld II did actually claim these benefits, the 
number of “Aufstocker” (German jargon, approximately: “topper-uppers”) 
would suddenly go up by about 2 million persons (Bruckmeier et al. 2007). 
But precariousness is by no means limited to the lowest segments of the 
labour market. It is present in a great variety of combinations in nearly all 
labour market sections (Pelizzari 2009). The emergence of a sector where 
wages are pushed below the actual value of labour has an effect on the still-
organised segments where employment is as yet relatively secure. In view of 
domains where collective bargaining and participation no longer work, and in 
their place, repression is traded for fear (Artus et al. 2009), regular employees 
are beginning to see their permanent jobs as a privilege to be defended with 
tooth and nail, even to the disadvantage of ‘weaker’, precarised interest 
groups. 
For this reason, precarisation has the effect of a system of power and con-
trol that makes regularly employed staff members toe the line as well (Dörre 
2009b). The disciplining régime of precariousness works in such a way that 
the ongoing erosion of the male-dominated normal employment relationship 
fails to bring about any further democratisation of gender relations. It is a fact 
that patriarchal structures have to some extent been eliminated and, at least in 
West Germany, women’s opportunities for access to regular wage labour 
have improved, although incentives to live one’s life according to the model 
of the family with a single male bread-earner still exist. In spite of all its 
value to emancipation, this development, supported to a relevant extent by 
the feminist movement, does also have a negative aspect. The potential of 
                                           
11 In the understanding of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit), this form of topping up an income is intended for persons who in addition to 
regular unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld I) require further transfers from the 
funds intended for basic material security, i.e. Arbeitslosengeld II, known in Germany 
under the term “Hartz IV”. In our context here, the notion is used in a broader sense, as 
usual in the debate, and applied also to employed persons who cannot secure their ex-
istence on their wages alone. 
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redundant female employees is an excellent way of reactivating the very 
reserve army mechanism which had been out of action for a short period in 
the socially integrative wage-labour societies with their organised labour 
markets. And beyond this, the subjective preparedness to accept insecure job 
conditions tended to be more pronounced among women, which has contrib-
uted towards a development where the gradual feminisation of wage labour is 
closely linked to the increase in precarity (Aulenbacher 2009: 65-80). 
The historically new type of discriminating precariousness, with its par-
ticular quality of increasingly affecting previously protected groups, has no 
precedent as far as its direct contact to the still relatively protected segments 
of the labour market. In developed countries, at the top end of the job pyra-
mid, we increasingly find qualified service jobs in proximity to management. 
In such jobs, one tends to find the type of the creatively working option-
maximising self-manager. Such mostly highly qualified employees and 
freelancers are constantly busy sounding out options. It is part of their habitus 
never to say no. They tend to be uncomfortable with the idea of time margins 
and kick-back time. They are constantly on the lookout for opportunities for 
action, as any missed option might turn out to result in a loss of individual 
status. Though the lower a person is positioned in the job hierarchy, the more 
difficult one will find it to enjoy the advantages of flexible employment, and 
to compensate for the disadvantages of impermanent contracts by means of 
satisfying creative work. To the greatest part of the actual precarious workers, 
those who are, for a longer period or permanently, dependent on insecure, 
badly paid, low-status jobs which are unsatisfying regarding content, such 
forms of compensation are virtually out of the question. In such cases, the 
principle of cumulation of risks and burdens applies. 
The actual extent of social polarisation in the labour market only becomes 
clear, though, if we take a glance at the global labour force. Also on a global 
scale, there have never been more people dependent on wage labour than 
today. Yet people in regular, relatively protected jobs represent only about 
20% of the global labour force, with a further 20% in the precarious sector, 
and a full 60% (1.8 billion people) existing on informal work, selling their 
labour without any kind of work contract. 700 million of these informally 
employed persons live on less than 1.25 US dollars per day and thus in 
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absolute poverty (ILO 2009; Jütting/de Laiglesia 2009; Roth 2010: 157f.). 
Many of these informally employed people are integrated into trans-national 
value-adding chains. Whether this can indeed be construed as the expression 
of a global tendency towards homogenisation (Roth 2010) is questionable, 
though. At present, the trans-national hierarchisation of wage labour is rather 
having the effect that people with regular jobs are also increasing their efforts 
to defend what remains of their social property against any claims made by 
migrants. 
6.  From intermediary to fractal organization? 
After this close look at the restructuring process in the labour markets, we 
can identify more precisely what the postulated changes in the functions of 
trade unions and social (class) conflict actually are. Despite, or possibly 
because of, their uncontestable successes in managing the crisis, the German 
unions now are also in danger of becoming mere pressure group agencies, 
representing the regular employees in specific branches such as the automo-
tive, supply, chemical or pharmaceuticals industry. This applies especially to 
the industrial unions, who, in face of the accelerated structural changes, are 
tending towards representing the interests of minority groups of wage earn-
ers. For like a catalyst, the global crisis has speeded up the sectoral changes 
even further: in 2010, only 18.9% of the workforce were still employed in 
industry (excluding construction) (1991: 29.3%), while 73.5% had jobs in the 
service sector (1991: 59.5 %). Even when taking into account that spin-offs 
and outsourcing practices have led to a rapid expansion of business-related 
service provision, and the existence of numerous services is indirectly de-
pendent on industrial enterprises, such data send the unmistakable signal that 
the interest situation of industrial workers among the entirety of wage earners 
is by now nothing more than a mere minority point of view, although still a 
very significant one in strategic terms. 
To keep presenting such a narrow focus on particular interests as repre-
sentation of ‘the’ interests of ‘the’ wage earners is becoming more and more 
difficult for the industrial unions. The extreme example quoted at the very 
beginning, of conservative interest policy in the arms industry, provides a 
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colourful illustration.12 What is new here is not so much the articulation of 
particular interests, a phenomenon observed repeatedly in the course of union 
history. The new thing is that these particular interests of minority factions of 
wage earners can hardly be combined with the perspective of collective 
upward mobility any more. This fact motivates shop-floor interest representa-
tion and trade unions to protect those industries where most of their remain-
ing members are employed. Their behaviour is that of a pressure group, 
representing partial interests of members in alliance with sections of business 
and the respectively favoured factions of the political class, also in opposition 
to super-ordinate, all-encompassing reproduction interests of society. Corpo-
ratism is always selective, but we are concerned with a special kind of selec-
tivity here, because the partial interests represented can hardly be reconciled 
with the idea of general wage earners’ and reproduction interests, in whatever 
way these may be defined. Representing the employment and income inter-
ests of minority factions of wage earners means a development from interme-
diary organisation towards a fractalised interest association, a fractal un-
ion.13 
The term fractal union used here was coined in analogy to certain 1990s 
management concepts. The model of fractal organisation consisted of a 
parent company subdivided into numerous decentralised units, with the 
parent co-operating with networks of loyal suppliers. In this kind of decen-
tralised organisation, there was always the danger of fractals becoming too 
independent. What was supposed to be considered the common group interest 
was subject to constant definition struggles and negotiation processes. The 
situation of the fractal union is similar. It, too, can refer to a general social or 
class interest, subject to interpretation, and would thus become a modern 
networked union, but not necessarily so. What can also be the case is that it 
limits itself to the role of mediator for the partial interests of still relatively 
protected groups of wage earners. Such a union would no longer be an inter-
                                           
12 This position as quoted on Tagesschau would definitely not be shared by a majority of 
IG Metall members. Yet until not so long ago, such a statement would have triggered a 
wave of indignation within the organisation. 
13 Translator’s note: the German term used by Klaus Dörre is Fraktalgewerkschaft. 
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mediary organisation with the capability to centralise wage earners’ interests, 
but merely a loosely organised association of influence groups with weakly 
developed or at least relatively non-committal general objectives. The fractals 
are thus no longer attracted by a centre of gravity, but tend towards existing 
as organisational power centres by themselves. As a consequence, a hetero-
geneity of interests is cultivated, which changes the dynamics of the former, 
traditional mixed system of dual industrial relations with regional bargaining, 
shop-floor specialisation and loose national co-ordination to a kind which is 
much harder to control. To put it more precisely: the fractal union is primar-
ily interested in securing the existence of the industries and companies where 
members still represented by them are employed. Other interests are consid-
ered subordinate to the aim of maintaining this status quo. What is crucial in 
this is that, in order to remain capable of acting at all, it needs to pander to the 
power centres within those companies where it still maintains representation. 
These power centres and the works council leadership of the large German 
export-oriented companies are more or less the same. Not only do the latter 
have specialist knowledge about their companies, they also have interpretive 
dominance over the members who are represented by them and who are 
unionised to a relevant degree. Without co-operation from these shop floor 
power centres, especially the industrial unions would lose most of their 
capacity to act. This is why within the union organisation, they form the 
centres of gravity to the relatively autonomous fractals. 
The transition to the fractalised union is not taking place by suddenly 
dumping the model of the intermediary organisation, it is rather more of a 
gradual process where the inner contradictions of this outdated type of or-
ganisation are intensified, accelerating the change. The (1) professional 
apparatus with its specific interests remains, though in structure and compo-
sition it is adapted according to the objectives of a conservative industrial 
policy. This mainly happens by means of a gradual shifting of the power 
centres within the organisation. As a rule, the leaders of the works councils of 
large company groups with comparatively highly unionised staff are the ones 
calling the tune internally. This does by no means imply that union leadership 
groups enforce the organisation’s interests in opposition to its members. On 
the contrary, (2) protective interests of groups of employees are served who 
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still have quite a bit to lose. In their self-perception, these mostly qualified 
blue- and white-collar workers are groups in the course of a collective social 
descent fighting for the remains of their social property. In this respect, the 
conservative interest policy corresponds to basal security needs of these 
groups and can even be extended to qualitative work and reproduction inter-
ests, in contrast to the quantifying logic of the intermediary organisation, 
though only highly selectively and only while the respective companies 
remain competitive. A consequence is that from the perspective of union 
leadership groups, to adapt to the partial interests represented by the works 
councils appears quite rational, because only by doing so, the (3) capability 
to implement union interest policy to a great extent can be guaranteed, while 
the ‘opportunism’ of shop-floor interest representation can at least be limited. 
The use of a particular form of wage earner power, which is based primarily 
on control over still partly protected company-internal labour market seg-
ments, in principle represents a ‘Polanyian’ reaction by specific groups of 
wage earners to market-driven competition and insecurity. This is a variety of 
exclusive solidarity in the attempt to maintain the ‘pacification’ of class 
conflict by (4) asserting that the promise of protection through institutional-
ised industrial relations should no longer or only to a limited extent apply to 
certain groups. So in the case of the fractalised interest association as a type, 
(5) we are no longer concerned with a functionalisation of ‘the’ unions as part 
of an economic policy. Rather, parts of the political élites are using the wage 
earners’ organisations as a kind of ‘transmission belt’ to secure access to the 
corporate level which otherwise is closed off to them. 
The most obvious changes, though, can be identified in the macrosocial 
conditions of action, the balancing of conflict and co-operation, and the 
unions’ attitude towards environmental issues. Even in a steering alliance 
with the weakened political élites, a fractalised interest association can no 
longer or hardly any longer assume steering functions with respect to the 
overall economy. Dependent on success in the arena of political exchange, an 
organisation of this type must make every effort to maintain possibilities of 
influencing the political élites, even at the price of losing associational power 
and the capability to mobilise and enter into conflict. The balance between 
conflict and co-operation shifts towards the latter, and what becomes less and 
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less clear is how these (organisational) power resources can be reproduced by 
means of which antagonistic co-operation could be enforced if deemed 
necessary. As a consequence, the unions are no longer able to efficiently 
perform the function of mediator between interests of the system and union 
members’ interests. For on the one hand, they meanwhile lack the instru-
ments of power to effectively correct systemically caused reproduction crises, 
while on the other hand, there is no guarantee, either, that the influence of 
such associations in political exchange is always strong enough to assert the 
elementary interests of the groups of wage earners still represented by them. 
7.  Perspectives of research 
If we put all the pieces of the puzzle together in the analysis, a picture is 
formed which differs considerably from the ideal type of the intermediary 
union. This does not mean, though, that the unions in Germany and other 
continental European countries have already completed the functional 
changes outlined above and made them irreversible. Reality is much more 
complex and contradictory, also as far as the DGB unions are concerned. 
This statement also applies to the German unions’ crisis management. Once it 
becomes clear that the reality of shop-floor negotiations and conflicts is 
heterogeneous, one will observe that job security for regular staff does not 
come naturally and all by itself. It is often only achieved after hard struggles 
between management and interest representation about concessions and the 
extent of flexibilisation expected of employees. Shop-floor campaigns against 
intended layoffs of regular employees or harder working conditions are no 
rare occurrences, in spite of the crisis. Yet it is quite obvious that in the most 
common forms of union reaction to the crisis, fractalising tendencies are 
distinctly present. This can be seen especially also in companies where 
mobilisations happened during the crisis. 
Conflict-oriented works council members in the metal and electrical in-
dustry agree in their statements that as a rule, mobilisations are only success-
ful if the matter is about clearly identifiable staff interests. Though even in 
such cases, desolidarising practices have become frequent on the shop floor. 
The idea of accepting short-time and pay cuts in order to prevent others from 
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getting sacked no longer seems automatically acceptable to parts of the 
workforce. Accordingly, almost 50% of the West German blue- and white-
collar workers at a car plant interviewed by us (Dörre et al. 2011) agree with 
the statement “A society that picks up everybody in its safety net cannot 
survive", and an even larger percentage of interviewees consider it necessary 
to subject the unemployed to greater pressure. In the organisational context of 
exclusive solidarity of this kind, new methods and forms of organisation 
(organizing, campaigning, etc.) may well still have their place. Yet they are 
likely to mutate to technocratic recruitment measures if they are not embed-
ded in a coherent policy of renewal. Without preparedness for conflict and 
especially without any social and oppositional movement in society, a re-
newal of structural as well as associational power resources is rather unlikely. 
Power which has merely been borrowed from the élites, on the other hand, 
may well turn out to be an illusion all too quickly, if it is not backed by the 
capability to organise and enter into conflict. This assessment also applies in 
particular to the currently dominant ‘crisis corporatism’. As soon as union 
participation in state and government decison-making processes begins to 
appear optional, the operational basis for the current ‘corporatism of weak-
ness’ will crumble away. So the unions’ comeback could very well expire 
just as quickly as the élites’ rekindled affection for them. 
The above statement applies to an even greater extent to countries where 
the unions are no longer even capable of striking any kind of corporative 
deals. It is possible that in some major continental European countries, the 
decline of union associational power has already progressed beyond the 
critical point after which any claim to be representing the entirety of wage 
earners is nothing but fiction. In Germany, this is already the case at least in 
the eastern Länder that used to constitute the GDR. Faced with a deep crisis 
of representation, the unions are likely to continue changing in their func-
tions, transforming even more into organisations representing particular 
interests. It should be clear that this is not only or primarily the result of 
political incompetence on the part of union leadership groups. To ensure 
relative job security even for a short term in the automotive value-adding 
system, in engineering or the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, for 
example, is a task that union interest policy can avoid only in complete self-
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abandonment and also by ignoring opportunities for development of society 
as a whole. When looking back on the deindustrialisation of the UK, one can 
hardly deny that the German unions’ efforts to at least maintain ‘industrial 
cores’ appear quite rational. 
Though from the perspective of the power resource approach, the question 
arises what will happen further if union influence in favour of short-term 
crisis management is bought for the price of their opting out of a fundamental 
debate on the deficiencies of the system of financial capitalism. From a 
distance, the fissures in the structure of the current ‘crisis corporatism’ (Ur-
ban 2010; Ehlscheid et al. 2010) may well remain invisible for another while, 
but inside Germany, they will be seen quite clearly at the latest once the 
conflict over the scheduled budget cuts following the first-aid restructuring of 
the ailing financial system begins to get hotter. The fissures will not lead to 
the quick collapse and disappearance of ‘crisis corporatism’ by itself. On the 
contrary, in particular the two large industrial unions, the IG BCE and IG 
Metall, may well tend towards continuing the crisis alliance with part of 
world market - oriented business and the government, even though officially, 
protest is raised against the government’s cost-cutting programme. In case of 
the IG BCE, this would mean continuing in its orientation towards social 
partnership in a modified form.14 To the IG Metall, on the other hand, such a 
course would mean a serious shift in its system of political coordinates. 
Formerly, especially in its body of functionaries, one of the power centres of 
a pluralistic political Left, this organisation in its mainstream is meanwhile 
not far from adopting the selective, industrial-policy-driven corporatism of 
the other large industrial union. In contrast, the service industry union Ver.di 
on its relatively government-critical course is rather isolated within the 
Confederation of German Trade Unions. And although in some of its major 
areas of organisation, such as the civil service, Ver.di has only limited options 
for conflict, this union is becoming more of a catalyst for unconventional 
action and strikes in areas (such as the recent nursery workers’ strike) which 
for the longest time have been considered marginal as active elements of the 
organisational power of trade unions. 
                                           
14  A course determination worth reading can be found in: Vassiliadis (2010). 
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In whichever way one may interpret the changes taking place within the 
DGB, whether as the result of an urgently necessary modernisation, or the 
abandonment of a claim to make a contribution towards shaping society, the 
fact remains that these changes cannot be captured by means of the analytical 
grid of the intermediary organisation. These are changes which can be per-
ceived first of all on the level of meaningful orientation systems (“union 
ideologies”; Hyman 2001), of normative integration and recruitment of 
professional as well as voluntary functionaries. The intermediarity concept is 
unsuitable when sounding out the scope for strategic choice the unions still 
have left. Although the tendencies towards fractalisation cannot just simply 
be reversed, the path towards becoming de-politicised representatives of 
pressure groups is still by no means the only possible direction. What is 
crucial here is not merely the fact that changes are taking place in the func-
tions of unions in society, but especially in what way they happen. It is quite 
possible that the unions, despite gradually losing their rooting in general and 
even among the specific groups of employees that constitute the majority of 
their clients nowadays, will be capable of acting inclusively and extending 
their field of reference to so-called weak interest groups: whether precari-
ously employed, long-term unemployed or the representatives of reproduc-
tion interests, without starting off any such alliance policies by making the 
usual claim for exclusive representation. Even those unions where there is an 
awareness that they are incapable of providing universal class representation 
have the option of showing internationalistic behaviour in trans-national 
value-adding chains, or of limiting their activities to defending particular 
local interests. They can either open up to welcome new groups, or concen-
trate on trying to protect a dwindling clientele of regulars. They can also keep 
their focus fixed on the shop floor and the company, or be prepared for 
conflict and take the offensive in the political arena. 
So although the functional changes are becoming more pronounced, there 
is still the possibility of strategic choice. In a certain way, the German trade 
unions are currently confronted with a problem wage earners’ organisations 
in (semi-)peripheral countries have had to deal with for a long time already: 
the subordinate classes are so fragmented, not least because of the great 
differences in social property at their disposal, that any attempt to represent 
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the resulting heterogeneity via just a few central organisations must invaria-
bly generate problems with integration. In contrast to the peripheral capital-
isms, wage earners in regular employment in Germany are still in the major-
ity, although, as already elaborated, atypical and precarious forms of em-
ployment are spreading rapidly. The difference to earlier phases of capitalist 
development is that in terms of organisation policy, the resulting heterogene-
ity can obviously no longer be structured by means of some kind of promise 
of collective upward mobility. Instead, with such asymmetry in the distribu-
tion of social property, rift lines develop, and in any attempt to repair these, 
an alliance policy involving subordinate classes or class factions and their 
organised representatives will be of even greater strategic importance than 
during the Fordist era. 
This is even more important because the dual economic and ecological 
crisis (not just) the western societies are going through demands fundamental 
reorientation in many respects, and these include union policy. A notion that 
used to be accepted almost without questioning as at least a temporary way 
out of an economic crisis, the necessity of material economic growth, is now, 
at least in its conventional application, without doubt contributing towards an 
intensification of resource scarcity, energy wasting, climate change, and thus 
an acceleration of the ecological crisis.15 This implies that also and especially 
those industries whose continuing existence is the aim of a defensive union 
policy protecting locations will undoubtedly be subjected to fundamental 
changes, as well, involving everything from products to required qualifica-
tions. A mere policy of maintaining the status quo may well still be success-
ful for a short period, but already in the medium term, the narrow time mar-
gin left to begin a substantial course change as far as the (re-)production 
model is concerned may be lost. No matter whether and in what way the 
German unions adapt to the new situation: to just continue with corporative 
industry policy strategies originally devised during the post-WWII era of 
social bureaucratic capitalism will definitely not produce any appropriate 
answers to the current, historically new crisis constellation. The pressure on 
                                           
15  Among the multitude of publications: Stern (2007); Jackson (2009). 
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the unions to change will continue; the price to pay for conservative procras-
tination will be the marginalisation of organized labour interests. 
In this phase of functional changes and self-change, trade unions as still 
highly significant actors in civil society are more than ever in need of re-
search from the social sciences, of critical analytic observation of all trans-
formations. Yet at least in Germany, very little of this kind of research is 
actually happening. While, surely with good reason, important protagonists 
of industrial relations research remain within the confines of the paradigm of 
the unions’ representation crisis, others use central concepts from the Fordist 
phase of capitalist development such as social market economy and interme-
diary organisation as normative convergence points of their analyses, while 
claiming to have found answers to the new challenges. In spite of all the 
plausibilities, both interpretation patterns can easily produce distorted views. 
What is taking place is by no means a linear decline of all union organisa-
tions in all the central capitalisms, nor can union activities during a crisis of 
transformation be reduced to those mediation services which the concept of 
intermediary organisation implies. Up-to-date research, in clear distinction to 
conventional analytic concepts, must engage in three tasks above all. 
First, it will be required to fulfill what has merely been formulated as a 
requirement in this paper. The task is to pursue the possibility of further 
changes in the functions of trade unions in society with the appropriate 
analytic distance and to investigate the social consequences of such changes, 
without being nice about the matter. In the Labour Revitalisation Studies, and 
also in our own materials, the tendency towards yet another round of func-
tional changes of unions in society has been underestimated up to now. The 
scope for strategic choice for the unions can only be sounded out if these 
gradual changes in unions’ functions are reflected scientifically, as a possible 
and to a large extent already factual reality. To intend to undertake such an 
endeavour implies that the opportunities and limits of union renewal are 
discussed beforehand in the context of availability of old and new power 
resources. In the relevant literature, we find agreement that it will hardly be 
sufficient to keep looking back to the traditional sources of proletarian power 
on the path away from conflict and opposition and hoping that they might 
still be there somewhere. In particular in the developed capitalisms, it will be 
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necessary to find new sources of power for social movements which are not, 
or not primarily, sparked off by capital-vs.-labour conflicts. Suggestions to 
identify communicative power as a new resource indicate an important 
phenomenon. In times of fractalisation, what becomes more and more sig-
nificant is to hold the dispersing parts together by means of the ‘non-coercive 
coercion’ of the better argument, of exchange through language, an informa-
tion policy of transparency, and the capability for discourse. Solidarity within 
as well as outside the union organisation more than ever requires communica-
tive, procedural foundations. Nevertheless, in our view, we are concerned 
primarily with a change in the dimension of ideological power. Collective 
union identities (Hyman 2001) and belief systems have always been con-
veyed by communication. In view of the dual economic and ecological crisis, 
in terms of power strategy the unions will likely mainly be concerned with 
exploring new syntheses of production and reproduction power. NGOs, 
women’s and ecological movements or also the co-op approaches of an 
economy of solidarity each have their own specific power resources. Regard-
ing this potential, something similar applies as in case of the ‘corporatism of 
the weak’ in a different situation. Power borrowed from others is fictitious 
power. The unions will thus not just be embraced, welcomed and invited to 
partake in the sources of reproductive power. It is not merely a matter of an 
inclusive alliance policy involving these kinds of actors and movements. The 
unions will also have to formulate political goals that will permit such strate-
gic co-operation. Only under these conditions will it be possible in future to 
get politicising stimuli from society to enter the trade unions, as it has hap-
pened on numerous occasions in the past. This is about content-based co-
operation in terms of a joint interest policy, about an association of produc-
tion- and reproduction-related actors. The term we use in speaking of such a 
search strategy is associated power.16 
Industrial relations and trade union research attempting to analytically ob-
serve the possible recombination of power resources will be required to 
                                           
16 Already at the beginning of the decade, Alain Lipietz had predicted a (re-)unification 
of labour and green movements. This was clearly too optimistic, but should not be ex-
cluded as a possibility (Lipietz 2000: 58ff.). 
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question its own theoretical foundations. In this context, it is necessary to 
review a second working hypothesis, which is: the smaller the size the areas 
still covered by participation and collective bargaining have been reduced to, 
the higher the probability of non-normative conflicts in other sectors of 
society. As a consequence, the social conflict splits apart, as can already be 
observed today. Those sectors and companies where the class conflict is still 
‘pacified’ by participation and collective bargaining still exist, but more and 
more, they appear as small islands scattered about a seething ocean. Collec-
tive labour (and non-labour-related) interests are therefore often articulated 
outside the normative conflicts. Also outside disconnected quarters and 
regions and not only since the crisis, a kind of ‘bargaining by riots’ is taking 
place which, despite the undeniable relevance of ethnic or gender-specific 
constructs, must be deciphered as the spontaneous expression of class action. 
General strikes, mass protest against layoffs and budget cuts as they have 
been occurring in Greece, Spain, Portugal, France or more recently in Algeria 
and Tunisia in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, have partly al-
ready assumed the character of uprisings and revolts aiming at conscious 
breaking of rules, also due to a feeling of powerlessness perceived by many 
of those involved (Dörre 2010b). All these are symptoms not of the end of 
organised labour relations, but of a change in their functions. To be able to 
treat such processes analytically, any research on labour relations and social 
(class) conflicts must widen the focus on its subject. The thing to do is to 
resume analytic investigation of labour unrest, non-normative conflict, local 
unrest, bread-and-butter conflicts flaring up into violent struggle, youth 
revolts and similar phenomena. The same applies to the strike intensity of 
unions and political (class) conflict. 
It is important, thirdly, to scientifically sound out the subjective potentials 
that can be of use in reviving the trade unions. Renewed labour awareness 
research will find that staff associations with sovereignty of definition always 
perceive only a segment of the manifold subjectivities which the workforces 
they represent consist of. Using the currently available, completely inade-
quate basis of data, one finds a rather odd constellation: labour awareness 
among core groups of wage earners at many of the businesses we investi-
gated is characterised by an odd ‘dual structure’ which can be outlined as 
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“good company, bad society”. One the one hand, there are many indicators of 
‘competitive solidarity’ among regular employees (“We are Porsche”, “We 
are Karstadt”). Though on the other hand, among many blue- and white-
collar workers, we find, apart from symptoms of exclusive solidarity, a latent 
anti-capitalism, which at present has no political home. A pragmatic “Sociol-
ogy of Criticism” as suggested by Boltanski (2010) will find an important 
field of analytic activity in this. Such a kind of sociology can never limit 
itself to exploring the thoughts, views and attitudes of people in their every-
day lives. But it pays them the appropriate attention in a range between 
understanding rejection and (possibly partial) consideration, in the attempt to 
revive science-based social criticism (ibid.: 21f.). What is certain, though, is 
that the current mainstream of industrial relations research is very far from 
even reflecting everyday shop-floor criticism of capitalism in all its radical-
ism and disconnectedness. This is yet another reason why innovations are 
required in theoretical work. 
Epilogue 
The person who pointed out the quotation at the very beginning to the author 
of these lines was a union man. This union secretary was quite successfully 
organising notes of protest against it locally, and he was not the only one. 
This is intended as a small compensation to all those who are annoyed about 
being supposed to accept that their work-intensive dedication gets decorated 
with the label of a fractalised interest association. As this episode once more 
illustrates, the future of the unions has not been decided yet. There are still 
opportunities for strategic choice. This does not necessarily mean that the 
history of the trade unions in the early 21st century will have a new and 
successful beginning. 
References 
Artus, Ingrid / Böhm, Sabine / Lücking, Stefan / Trinczek, Rainer (2009): Jenseits der 
Mitbestimmung. Interessenhandeln in Betrieben ohne Betriebsrat. Frankfurt/New 
York: Campus. 
Astheimer, Sven (2010): Beschäftigt. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 July 2010: 9. 
46 Klaus Dörre 
   
Aulenbacher, Brigitte (2009): Die soziale Frage neu gestellt – Gesellschaftsanalysen der 
Prekarisierungs- und Geschlechterforschung. In: Robert Castel / Klaus Dörre (Eds.): 
Prekarität, Abstieg, Ausgrenzung. Die soziale Frage am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. 
Frankfurt a. M./New York: Campus: 65-80. 
Baccaro, Lucio (2010): Does the global financial crisis mark a turning point for labour? 
The collapse of finance but labour remains weak. In: Socio-Economic-Review, 8: 341-
376. 
Boltanski, Luc (2010): On critique. A Scoiology of Emancipation. Cambridge/Malden: 
Politiy Press. 
Boltanski, Luc / Chiapello, Ève (2005): The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso. 
Briefs, Götz (1927): Gewerkschaftswesen und Gewerkschaftspolitik. Handwörterbuch der 
Staatswissenschaften. Eds.: Johannes Conrad, Ludwig Elster, Wilhelm Hector Lexis 
and Edgar Loening. Jena: Fischer: 1108-1150. 
Brinkmann, Ulrich / Choi, Hae-Lin / Detje, Richard / Dörre, Klaus / Holst, Hajo / 
Karakayali, Serhat / Schmalstieg, Catharina (2008): Strategic Unionism: Aus der Krise 
zur Erneuerung? Umrisse eines Forschungsprogramms. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Bruckmeier, Kerstin / Graf, Tobias / Rudolph, Helmut (2007): Aufstocker – bedürftig trotz 
Arbeit. Erwerbstätige Leistungsbezieher im SGB II. IAB-Kurzbericht 22. 
Buci-Glucksmann, Christine / Therborn, Göran (1982): Der sozialdemokratische Staat. 
Die Keynesianisierung der Gesellschaft. Hamburg: VSA. 
Crouch, Colin (2010): The financial crisis – a new chance for labour movements? Not Yet. 
In: Socio-Economic-Review, 8(2): 341-376. 
Deppe, Frank (1979): Autonomie und Integration. Materialien zur Gewerkschaftsanalyse 
(Schriftenreihe für Sozialgeschichte und Arbeiterbewegung der Studiengesellschaft für 
Sozialgeschichte und Arbeiterbewegung Marburg, Vol. 9. Marburg: Arbeiterbewe-
gung und Gesellschaftswissenschaft. 
Dörre, Klaus (2009a): Die neue Landnahme. Dynamiken und Grenzen des Finanzmarkt-
kapitalismus. In: Klaus Dörre / Stephan Lessenich / Hartmut Rosa (Eds.): Soziologie – 
Kapitalismus – Kritik. Eine Debatte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp: 21-86. 
Dörre, Klaus (2009b): Prekarität im Finanzmarkt-Kapitalismus. In: Robert Castel / Klaus 
Dörre (Eds.): Prekarität, Abstieg, Ausgrenzung. Die soziale Frage am Beginn des 21. 
Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt: Campus: 35-64 
Dörre, Klaus (2010a): Landnahme und soziale Klassen. Zur Relevanz sekundärer Ausbeu-
tung. In: Hans-Günther Thien (Ed.): Klassen im Postfordismus. Münster: Westfäli-
sches Dampfboot: 113-151. 
Dörre, Klaus / Holst, Hajo / Matuschek, Ingo (2011): Der Shareholder Value ist tot, es 
lebe die Maximalrendite! Von Management-Mimikry zu arbeitspolitischen Alternati-
ven. In: Lothar Schröder / Hans-Jürgen Urban (Eds.): Gute Arbeit. Folgen der Krise, 
Arbeitsintensivierung und Restrukturierung. Frankfurt: Bund Verlag: 80-98. 
Dörre, Klaus (2010b): Überbetriebliche Regulierung von Arbeitsbeziehungen. In: Fritz 
Böhle / Günter G. Voß (Eds.): Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie. Wiesbaden: 873-912. 
Dörre, Klaus / Röttger, Bernd (2006): Im Schatten der Globalisierung. Strukturpolitik, 
Netzwerke und Gewerkschaften in altindustriellen Regionen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Dullien, Sebastian / Herr, Hansjörg / Kellermann, Christian (2011): Decent Capitalism. A 
Blueprint for Reforming our Economies. London: Pluto Press. 
 Functional Changes in the Trade Unions. From Intermediary to Fractal Organization? 47 
  
 
Ehlscheid, Christoph / Pickshaus, Klaus / Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2010): Die große Krise und 
die Chancen der Gewerkschaften – Ein Beitrag zur Strategiedebatte. In: Sozialismus, 
37(6): 43-49. 
Esser, Josef (2003): Funktion und Funktionswandel der Gewerkschaften in Deutschland. 
In: Wolfgang Schroeder / Bernd Wessels (Eds.): Die Gewerkschaften in Politik und 
Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ein Handbuch. Opladen: Westdeut-
scher Verlag: 65-85. 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 31. 12.2010, 66: 12f. 
Frege, Carola / Kelly, John (2003): Union Revitalization in Comparative Perspective. In: 
European Journal of Industrial Relations, 9: 17-24. 
Gerlinger, Thomas (2009): Der Wandel der Interessenvermittlung in der Gesundheitspoli-
tik. In: Ulrich Willems / Thomas von Winter / Britta Rehder (Eds.): Interessenvermitt-
lung in Politikfeldern im Wandel. Befunde aus Verbände- und Policyforschung zur 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in vergleichender Sicht. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Haipeter, Thomas (2009) Tarifabweichungen und Flächentarifverträge. Eine Analyse der 
Regulierungspraxis in der Metall- und Elektroindustrie. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag. 
Harvey, David (2010): The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. Oxford: 
University Press. 
Hyman, Richard (2001): Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, 
Class and Society. London: Sage. 
Hyman, Richard / Gumbrell-McCormick, Rebecca (2010): Trade Unions and the crisis: a 
lost opportunity? In: Socio-Economic-Review, 8: 341-376. 
International Labour Office (2008): Global Economic Trends. Genf. 
Jackson, Timothy (2009): Prosperity without growth. Economics for a finite Planet. 
London: Earthscan. 
Jütting, P. Johannes / Laiglesia, Juan R. (2009): Is Informal normal? Towards more and 
better Jobs in Developing Countries. Paris. 
Lipietz, Alain (2000): Die große Transformation des 21. Jahrhunderts. Ein Entwurf der 
politischen Ökologie. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. 
Luxemburg, Rosa (1971): The Mass Strike: The Political Party and the Trade Unions. 
New York: Harper & Row. 
Mann, Michael (1994): Geschichte der Macht. Erster Band. Von den Anfängen bis zur 
griechischen Antike. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. 
Marginson, Paul (2010): New forms of co-operation, new forms of conflict. In: Socio-
Economic-Review, 8: 341-376. 
Marx, Karl / Engels, Friedrich (2009): The Communist Manifesto. Teddington: Echo 
Library. 
Milkman, Ruth (2010): The US labour movement and the audacity of hope. In: Socio-
Economic-Review 8: 341-376. 
Müller-Jentsch, Walther (1995): Auf dem Prüfstand. Das deutsche Modell industrieller 
Beziehungen. In: Industrielle Beziehungen, 3(1): 11-24. 
Müller-Jentsch, Walther (2008): Gewerkschaften als intermediäre Organisationen. In: 
Walther Müller-Jentsch (Ed.): Arbeit und Bürgerstatus. Studien zur sozialen und in-
dustriellen Demokratie. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag: 51-78. 
48 Klaus Dörre 
   
Müller-Jentsch, Walther (2009): Vom Klassenkampf zum Korporatismus. Gewerkschaften 
im Rheinischen Kapitalismus a. D.. In: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 
55(7): 61-70. 
Pelizzari, Alessandro (2009) Dynamiken der Prekarisierung. Atypische Erwerbsverhältnis-
se und milieuspezifische Unsicherheitsbewältigung. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag. 
Regini, Mario (2010): The increasing individualization of work and labour. In: Socio-
Economic-Review, 8: 341-376. 
Roth, Karl-Heinz (2010): Die globale Krise. Globale Krise – Globale Proletarisierung – 
Gegenperspektiven. Hamburg: VSA. 
Sennett, Richard (2007): The Culture of the New Capitalism. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Silver, Beverly J. (2003): Forces of Labour. Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 
1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sinn, Hans-Werner (2005): Ist Deutschland noch zu retten? Berlin: Ullstein. 
Stern, Nicholas (2007): The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review. Cambrid-
ge: University Press. 
Streeck, Wolfgang (2009): Re-forming capitalism. Institutional change in the German 
political economy. Oxford: University Press. 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Nr. 2, Dienstag, 4. Januar 2011: 19. 
Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2010): Wohlfahrtsstaat und Gewerkschaftsmacht im Finanzmarkt-
Kapitalismus: Der Fall Deutschland: In: WSI-Mitteilungen, 63(9): 443-450. 
Vassiliadis, Michael (2010): Für den Fortschritt. Industriepolitik des 21. Jahrhunderts. 
Bonn: Vorwärts Buch. 
Wacquant, Loïc (2008): Urban Outcasts. London: Polity Press. 
Waddington, David / Jobard, Fabien / King, Mike (Eds.) (2009): Rioting in the UK and 
France. A Comparative Analysis. Cullompton/Portland: Willan Publishing. 
Weber, Max (1978): Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Wright, Eric O. (2000): Working Class Power, Capitalist Class Interests, and Class 
Compromise. In: American Journal of Sociology, 105(4), 957-1002. 
Yergin, Daniel / Stanislaw, Joseph (1999): Staat oder Markt. Die Schlüsselfrage unseres 
Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. 
 
About the author 
Dr. Klaus Dörre, Professor of Labour Studies and Economioc Sociology 
at Friedrich-Schiller University Jena. His research interests are financial-
ised capitalism, precarious work and industrial relations. 
 
Author’s address 
Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Institut für Soziologie, Carl-Zeiß-Str. 
2, 07743 Jena, Germany. 
E-mail: Klaus.doerre@uni-jena.de 
